rounds us. We apprehend and know it as something both "inward" and "outward"—as an inward energy which assumes objective form in the outward world.

> In speech the energy of the mind breaks a path through the lips, but its product returns through our own ears. The idea is translated into true objectivity without being withdrawn from subjectivity. Only language can do this; and without this translation into an objectivity which returns to the subject—and such a translation occurs, even though silently, wherever language is at work—the formation of concepts and hence all true thought would be impossible. . . . For language cannot be regarded as a substance which is present, which can be apprehended as a whole or gradually communicated; it is something which must be constantly produced, and while the laws according to which it is produced are defined, its scope and in a certain sense the manner in which it is produced remains indeterminate. . . . Just as the particular sound mediates between the object and the man, so the whole language mediates between him and the nature that works upon him from within and without. He surrounds himself with a world of sounds in order to assimilate and elaborate the world of objects.[6]

In this critical, idealistic view of language, Humboldt mentions a factor which occurs in every type and form of symbolism. In each one of its freely projected signs the human spirit apprehends the object and at the same time apprehends itself and its own formative law. And this peculiar interpenetration prepares the way for the deeper determination both of subject and object. On the first level of this determination, it appears as though the two antithetical factors simply stood separately, side by side and juxtaposed. In its earliest formations, speech can equally well be interpreted as a pure expression of the inward or the outward, as an expression of *mere* subjectivity or mere objectivity. In the first case the spoken sound seems to be nothing other than an expression of excitement and emotion, in the second case it seems to be mere onomatopoeic imitation. The various speculations on the "origin of language" do indeed move between these two extremes, neither of which reach the core and essence of

6. W. V. Humboldt, "Einleitung zum Kawi-Werk," *Werke*, ed. Albert Leitzmann, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 7, No. 1, 55 ff. See *Über die Kawi-Sprache auf der Insel Java* (3 vols. Berlin, 1836–39), Vol. 1, "Einleitung."

language itself. For what language designates and expresses is neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively objective; it effects a new mediation, a particular *reciprocal relation* between the two factors. Neither the mere discharge of emotion, nor the repetition of objective sound stimuli yields the characteristic meaning and form of language: language arises where the two ends are joined, so creating a new synthesis of "I" and "world." An analogous relation is created in every truly independent and original function and consciousness. Art can no more be defined as the mere expression of inward life than as a reflection of the forms of outward reality; in it, too, the crucial and characteristic factor is to be sought in how, through it, the "subjective" and "objective," pure emotion and pure form, merge with one another and so gain a new permanence and a new content. In all these examples we see more sharply than is possible if we limit ourselves to the purely intellectual function, that in analyzing the cultural forms we cannot begin with a rigid dogmatic distinction between the subjective and objective, but that they are differentiated and their spheres defined only through these forms themselves. Each particular cultural energy contributes to this definition in its particular way and plays its own characteristic part in establishing the concepts of the I and of the world. Cognition, language, myth and art: none of them is a mere mirror, simply reflecting images of inward or outward data; they are not indifferent media, but rather the true sources of light, the prerequisite of vision, and the wellsprings of all formation.

3. The Problem of "Representation" and the Structure of Consciousness

In analyzing language, art, myth, our first problem is: how can a finite and particular sensory content be made into the vehicle of a general spiritual "meaning"? If we content ourselves with considering the material aspect of the cultural forms, with describing the physical properties of the signs they employ, then their ultimate, basic elements seem to consist in an aggregate of particular sensations, in simple qualities of sight, hearing, or touch. But then a miracle occurs. Through the manner in which it is contemplated, this simple sensory material takes on a new and varied life.

When the physical sound, distinguished as such only by pitch and intensity and quality, is formed into a word, it becomes an expression of the finest intellectual and emotional distinctions. What it immediately is, is thrust into the background by what it accomplishes with its mediation, by what it "means." The concrete particular elements in a work of art also disclose this basic relation. No work of art can be understood as the simple *sum* of these elements, for in it a definite law, a specific principle of aesthetic formation are at work. The synthesis by which the consciousness combines a series of tones into the unity of a melody, would seem to be totally different from the synthesis by which a number of syllables is articulated into the unity of a "sentence." But they have one thing in common, that in both cases the sensory particulars do not stand by themselves; they are articulated into a conscious *whole,* from which they take their qualitative meaning.

If we attempt a broad initial survey of the basic relations which constitute the unity of consciousness, our attention is first drawn to certain mutually independent "modes" of combination. The factor of "juxtaposition" as it appears in the form of *space,* the factor of succession as in the form of *time*—the combination of material properties in such a way that one is apprehended as a *"thing,"* the other as an "attribute," or of successive events in such a way that the one appears as a *cause* of the other: all these are examples of such original types of relation. Sensationalism strives in vain to derive them from the immediate content of particular impressions. "Five tones on a flute" may, to be sure, according to Hume's well-known psychological theory, "add up to" the idea of time—but this result is possible only if "succession," the characteristic factor of relation and order, has been tacitly drawn into the content of the particular tones, so that the universal structure of time is taken as a premise. For psychological as well as epistemological analysis, the basic forms of relation prove to be just such simple and irreducible "qualities" of consciousness as the simple sensory qualities, the elements of sight, hearing or touch. And yet philosophical thought cannot content itself with accepting the diversity of these relations as such, as a simple given fact. In dealing with the sensations it may suffice to list their principal classes and consider them as an unconnected multiplicity; but when we come to the relations, it would seem that the operation of their particular forms becomes intelligible to us only when we think of them as connected by a higher synthesis. Since Plato in *The Sophists* formulated this problem of the *κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν*, the systematic "community" of pure ideas and formal concepts, it has remained alive throughout the history of philosophy. The critical and the metaphysical-speculative solutions to the problem differ in that they presuppose different concepts of the "universal" and hence a different notion of the logical system itself. The former view goes back to the concept of the analytic universal, the latter aims at a synthetic universal. In the critical view we content ourselves with gathering all the possible forms of connection into a systematic concept and thus *subordinating* them to definite fundamental laws; in the metaphysical view we seek to understand how the concrete totality of particular forms develops from a single original principle. The metaphysical view admits of only *one* initial point and *one* end point, which are connected with one another by the constant application of one and the same methodical principle to a synthetic-deductive demonstration—the critical view not only tolerates but encourages several different dimensions of inquiry. It raises the problem of a unity which from the outset makes no claim to simplicity. The different modes in which the human spirit gives form to reality are recognized as such, and no attempt is made to fit them into a single, simply progressing series. And yet, in such an approach we by no means abandon the idea of a connection between the particular forms as such; this approach sharpens, on the contrary, the idea of the system by replacing the concept of a simple system with the concept of a complex system. Each form, in a manner of speaking, is assigned to a special plane, within which it fulfills itself and develops its specific character in total independence—but precisely when all these ideal modes are considered together, certain analogies and certain typical relations appear, which can be singled out and described as such.

The first factor we encounter is a difference, which we may term the difference in the *quality* and *modality* of forms. By the "quality" of a given relation we here understand the particular type of combination by means of which it creates series within the whole of consciousness, the arrangement of whose members is subject to a special law. Thus, for example, the relation of simultaneity as opposed to succession constitutes such an independent quality. On the other hand, one and the same form of relation can undergo an inner transformation if it occurs within a different *formal context.* Each particular relation belongs—regardless of its particularity—to a *totality* of meanings which itself possesses its own "nature," its self-contained formal law. Thus, for example, the universal relation which we call "time" is just as much an element of theoretical sci-

entific *cognition* as an essential factor in certain structures of the *aesthetic* consciousness. Time, as explained in the beginning of Newton's *Mechanics* as the stable basis of all motion and the uniform measure of all change, seems at first sight to have nothing more than the name in common with the time that governs a work of music and its rhythmic measures—and yet this unity of nomenclature involves a unity of meaning at least in so far as both posit that universal and abstract quality which we term "succession." But the consciousness of natural laws as laws of the temporal form of motion and the consciousness of musical measure have each their own specific mode of succession. Similarly, we can interpret certain spatial forms, certain complexes of lines and figures, in one case as an artistic ornament and in another as a geometrical figure, so endowing one and the same material with entirely different meanings. The spatial unity which we build in aesthetic vision and creation, in painting, sculpture and architecture, belongs to an entirely different sphere from the spatial unity which is represented in geometrical theorems and axioms. In the one case we have the modality of the logical-geometric concept, in the other the modality of artistic imagination—in the one case, space is conceived as an aggregate of mutually independent relations, as a system of "causes" and "consequences"; in the other, it is conceived as a whole whose particular factors are dynamically interlocked, a perceptual, emotional unity. And the consciousness of space can assume still other forms: for in *mythical thinking* we find again a very special approach to space, a manner of articulating and "orienting" the spatial world that differs sharply and characteristically from the spatial articulation of the cosmos in empirical thinking.[7] Likewise, the general form of *causality* appears in a totally different light accordingly as we consider it on the plane of scientific or of mythical thinking. Myth also knows the concept of causality, which it employs both in its general theogonies and cosmogonies and in its interpretations of all sorts of particular phenomena which it "explains" mythically on the basis of this concept. But the ultimate motive of this "explanation" is entirely different from that which governs the study of causality by theoretical, scientific concepts. The *problem* of the origin as such is common to science and myth; but the type and character, the modality of the origin changes as soon as we move from the one province to the other—as soon

7. Cf. my study, *Die Begriffsform im mythischen Denken, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg*, Vol. 1 (Leipzig, Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1922).

as we use the origin and learn to understand it as a scientific *principle*, rather than as a mythical *potency*.

We see, then, that in order to characterize a given form of relation in its concrete application and concrete meaning, we must not only state its qualitative attributes as such, but also define the system in which it stands. If we designate the various kinds of relation—such as relation of space, time, causality, etc.—as R_1, R_2, R_3, we must assign to each one a special "index of modality," μ_1, μ_2, μ_3, denoting the context of function and meaning in which it is to be taken. For each of these contexts, language as well as scientific cognition, art as well as myth, possesses its own constitutive principle which sets its stamp, as it were, on all the particular forms within it. The result is an extraordinary diversity of formal relations, whose richness and inner involvements, however, can be apprehended only through a rigorous analysis of each fundamental form. But even aside from such an analysis, the most general survey of consciousness as a whole reveals certain fundamental conditions of unity, prerequisites for synthesis, combination, and statement. It lies in the very nature of consciousness that it cannot posit any content without, by this simple act, positing a complex of other contents. Kant—in his treatise on negative quantities—once formulated the problem of causality as the endeavor to understand why because *something* is, *something else*, of a totally different nature, ought to be and is. If with dogmatic metaphysics we take the concept of absolute *being* as our starting point, this question must seem ultimately insoluble. For an absolute being implies ultimate absolute elements, each of which is a static substance in itself, and must be conceived for itself. But this concept of substance discloses no necessary or even intelligible transition to the multiplicity of the world, to the diversity of its particular phenomena. Even in Spinoza the transition from substance as that which *in se est et per se concipitur*, to the multiplicity of particular, dependent and changeable *modi* is not deduced but arrived at by stealth. Metaphysics, as its history shows, is confronted more and more by a logical dilemma. It must either take seriously the fundamental concept of being, in which case all relations tend to evaporate, all the multiplicity of space, time, causality threatens to disperse into mere illusion—or it must, in recognizing these relations, turn them into mere "accidents" of being. But here metaphysics encounters a characteristic difficulty, for it becomes increasingly apparent that it is these "accidents" which are accessible to *cognition*,

which can be apprehended in its forms, while the naked "essence," which is supposedly the foundation of the particular qualities and relations, becomes lost in the void of mere abstraction. What is ostensibly the "whole of reality" contains nothing but its definition and proves ultimately to have lost all independent, positive concretion.

This dialectic of metaphysical ontology can be avoided only if, from the very start, "content" and "form," "element" and "relation" are conceived not as terms independent of one another, but as concurrent and mutually determining one another. The modern, "subjective" trend in speculation has brought this general methodological approach increasingly to the fore. For the question assumes a new form once it is removed from the realm of absolute being to the sphere of consciousness. Every "simple" quality of consciousness has a definite content only in so far as it is apprehended in complete unity with certain qualities but separately from others. The function of this unity and this separation is not removable from the content of consciousness but constitutes one of its essential conditions. Accordingly there is nó "something" in consciousness that does not *eo ipso* and without further mediation give rise to "another" and to a series of others. For what defines each particular content of consciousness is that in it the whole of consciousness is in some form posited and represented. Only in and through this *representation* does what we call the "presence" of the content become possible. This is immediately evident when we consider even the simplest instance of this presence, the temporal relation and the temporal "present." Nothing seems more certain than that every truly *immediate* content of consciousness has reference to a definite "now" in which it is contained. The past is "no longer" in the consciousness, the future is "not yet" in it: neither seems to belong to its concrete reality, its true actuality, but to dissolve into mere logical abstractions. And yet the content which we designate as the "now" is nothing but the eternally fluid boundary dividing the past from the future. This boundary cannot be posited independently of what it bounds: it exists only in this act of division itself, not as something that could be thought before this division and detached from it. The temporal moment, in so far as we mean to define it *as* temporal, can be apprehended only as the fluid transition from past to future, from no-longer to not-yet, and not as static substantial being. Where the now is interpreted differently, that is, absolutely, it represents no longer an element of time, but the negation of time. It seems then to halt and so negate the movement of time. For a school of thought like that of the Eleatic philosophers, which is oriented toward an absolute being in which it strives to persist, the flying arrow is *at rest,* because in every indivisible "now" it has only one single, unequivocally defined and invisible "position." But if the temporal moment is to be conceived as *pertaining* to temporal motion, it must not be removed from it and opposed to it, but truly situated in it: and this is only possible if in thinking the moment as a particular, we concurrently think the process as a whole, and if both, moment and process, merge into a perfect unity for consciousness. The form of time itself can be "given" for us only when the temporal sequence is represented as running forward and backward. If we think a particular cross section of consciousness, we can apprehend it, not by dwelling exclusively in this cross section, but only by going beyond it into the various related directions by means of definite spatial, temporal, or qualitative ordering functions. Only because in this way we can ascertain in the actual content of consciousness something that is not, in the given something that is not given—does there exist for us that unity which on the one hand we designate as the subjective unity of consciousness, and on the other as the objective unity of the object.

The psychological and epistemological analysis of the spatial consciousness takes us back to the same original function of representation. We can apprehend a spatial "whole" only by presupposing the formation of various temporal series: even though the simultaneous synthesis of consciousness constitutes a specific and original part of consciousness in general, it can only be completed and represented on the basis of the successive synthesis. If specific elements are to be combined into a spatial whole, they must pass through the sequence of consciousness and be related to one another in accordance with a definite rule. Neither the sensationalist psychology of the English nor the metaphysical psychology of Herbart was able to explain intelligibly how the consciousness of spatial synthesis originates in the consciousness of temporal synthesis—how a consciousness of "togetherness" can be shaped from a mere sequence of visual, tactile and motor sensations, or from a complex of simple sequences of percepts. But despite their entirely different points of departure, these theories have one thing in common: they all recognize that space in its concrete configuration and articulation is not "given" as a ready-made possession of the psyche, but comes into being only in the process or, one might say, in the general movement of consciousness. However, this process itself would disintegrate into isolated and unrelated particulars, permitting no synthesis into *one*

result, if there were not, here again, the general possibility of apprehending the whole in the part and the part in the whole. Leibniz defined consciousness as an "expression of the many in the one," and here again this *multorum in uno expressio* is the determining factor. We intuit spatial *configurations* only by combining into *one* idea complete groups of sensory perceptions which mutually displace one another in immediate sensory experience, and on the other hand by diffusing this unity through the diversity of its particular components. It is only by this interplay of concentration and analysis that spatial consciousness is constructed. Form then appears as potential motion, while motion appears as potential form.

In his inquiries into the theory of vision, which form the starting point of modern physiological optics, Berkeley compared the development of spatial perception to the development of language. There is a kind of natural language, i.e., a fixed relationship between signs and meanings, which alone, in his belief, makes spatial perception possible. It is not by copying a ready-made material model of "absolute space" in our minds, but by learning to use the different, intrinsically incommensurate impressions of the diverse sensory spheres, particularly those of sight and touch, as representatives and signs for one another, that we create our world of space as a world of systematically related perceptions. In line with his sensationalist approach, Berkeley interpreted this language of the mind, which he proved to be a condition of spatial perception, exclusively as a language of the *senses*. But on closer scrutiny this interpretation negates itself. For it lies in the very concept of language that it can never be purely sensuous, but represents a characteristic interpenetration and interaction of sensuous and conceptual factors; in language it is always presupposed that individual sensory signs be filled with general intellectual meaning content. The same is true of every other kind of "representation"—that is, of every instance where one element of consciousness is represented in and through another. We may suppose the sensory foundation of the idea of space to lie in certain visual, motor and tactile sensations, but the sum of these sensations contains no trace of that characteristic form of unity which we call "space." The notion of space is manifested rather in a kind of coordination which enables us to pass from any one of these qualities to their totality. In every element that we posit as spatial, our consciousness posits an infinite number of potential *directions*, and only the sum of these directions constitutes the whole of our spatial intuition. The spatial "picture" that we possess of a particular empirical object, a house for example, takes form only when

we amplify a particular, relatively limited perspective view in this sense; employing the partial perspective only as a starting point and stimulus, we construct from it a highly complex totality of spatial relations. Understood in this light, space is by no means a static vessel and container into which ready-made "things" are poured; it is rather a sum of ideal functions, which complement and determine one another to form a unified result. Just as in the simple temporal "now" earlier and later are expressed as the basic temporal directions, similarly in every "here" we posit a "there." The particular place is not given prior to the spatial system but only in reference to it and in correlation with it.

A third form of unity which is situated above spatial and temporal unity is the form of *objectifying* synthesis. When we combine a sum of determinate properties into the whole of a constant thing with diverse and variable characteristics, this combination presupposes simultaneous and successive syntheses, but that is not all. The relatively constant must be distinguished from the variable—certain spatial configurations must be apprehended before the concept of the thing as the constant "vehicle" of the variable properties can take form. On the other hand, the idea of this "vehicle" adds to the intuition of spatial simultaneity and temporal succession a characteristic new factor of independent importance. Empiricist analysis has indeed attempted again and again to deny this independence. It sees in the idea of the thing nothing other than a purely outward form of combination and attempts to show that the content and form of the "object" are exhausted in the sum of its attributes. But here we find the same fundamental fallacy as in the empiricist dissection of the concept and consciousness of the I. When Hume explains the self as a "bundle of perceptions," this explanation—aside from the fact that it merely speaks of combination as such but says nothing whatsoever concerning the *particular* form and type of synthesis that constitutes the self—negates itself because in the concept of perception the concept of the self, which was supposedly analyzed and dissected, is contained in its undissected totality. What makes the particular perception a perception, what distinguishes it as a "perceptual" quality from any material quality is precisely its "appurtenance to the self." This relation to the self does not arise through the synthesis of a number of perceptions but is an original characteristic of each one. A closely analogous relation prevails in the synthesis of diverse "properties" into the unity of a "thing." When we combine the sensations of extension, sweetness, roughness, whiteness into the idea of "sugar" as a unified whole, this is possible

only because each one of these qualities is originally thought in reference to this whole. The whiteness or sweetness, etc., is not apprehended merely as a condition within me, but as a "property" and objective quality, because I have already attained the desired function and perspective of the "thing." Thus the particular can be posited only on the basis of a universal schema which is merely filled with new concrete content as our experience of the "thing" and its "attributes" progresses. The point as a simple and particular position is possible only "in" space, i.e., logically speaking, under presupposition of a *system* comprising all designations of position; the idea of the temporal "now" can be defined only in relation to a *sequence* of moments and to the order of succession that we call "time"—and the same is true of the relation between the thing and its properties. All these relations (the detailed definition and analysis of which are the business of specialized epistemology) disclose the same fundamental characteristic of consciousness, namely, that the whole is not obtained from its parts, but that every notion of a part already encompasses the notion of the whole, not as to content, but as to general structure and form. Every particular belongs from the outset to a definite *complex* and in itself expresses the rule of this complex. It is the totality of these rules which constitutes the true unity of consciousness, as a unity of time, space, objective synthesis, etc.

The traditional language of psychology offers no entirely adequate term for this state of affairs, because it is only recently, in the development of the modern "gestalt psychology," that this discipline has torn itself away from a fundamental sensationalism. For the sensationalist approach, which sees all objectivity as encompassed in the "simple" impression, synthesis consists merely in the "association" of impressions. This term is broad enough to cover all relations that can possibly exist in the consciousness; but by its very breadth it obscures their specific character. It fails to distinguish between relations of the most diverse quality and modality. "Association" means the fusion of elements into the unity of time or of space, into the unity of the ego or the object, into the whole of a thing or of a sequence of events—into series whose members are connected by the criterion of cause and effect and into series whose members are connected by the criterion of "means" and "end." "Association" also passes as an adequate term for the logical law by which particulars are synthesized into the conceptual unity of *cognition,* or for the forms of configuration which prove effective in the development of the *aesthetic* consciousness. But here again, it is evident that this term designates only the naked fact of combination as such, but does not say anything whatsoever regarding its specific character and law. The diversity of the paths and directions by which consciousness arrives at its syntheses is totally obscured. If we designate the "elements" as a, b, c, d, etc., their combinations, as we have seen, form a precisely graduated and internally differentiated system of diverse functions: F (a, b), (c, d), etc. This system, however, is by no means stated in the alleged generic term "association" which, on the contrary, levels and hence negates it. And the term has still another essential failing. However closely they may combine and "fuse," the contents that are brought together in association remain *separable,* both as to meaning and origin. In the course of experience they are articulated into increasingly stable organizations and groups; however, their existence as such is not given by the group, but precedes it. Yet it is precisely this relation of the "part" to the "whole" that is fundamentally surpassed in the true syntheses of consciousness. Here the whole does not *originate* in its parts, it *constitutes* them and gives them their essential meaning. In thinking of any limited segment of space we also think of its orientation to the whole of space; in every particular moment of time we encompass the universal form of succession; and in positing any particular attribute we posit the general relation of "substance" and "accident," hence the characteristic form of the object. It is precisely this interpenetration, this interdetermination which association, since it states merely the contiguity of ideas, leaves unexplained. The empirical rules it sets up regarding the mere flow of ideas fail to make intelligible the specific and fundamental forms in which ideas combine, or the unity of "meaning" that arises among them.

The rationalistic theory of knowledge set out to save and demonstrate the independence of this "meaning." One of its essential historical achievements is to have established by one and the same intellectual operation a new and deeper view of consciousness as such and a new concept of the "object" of knowledge. It confirmed Descartes' dictum that the unity of the objective world, the unity of substance, could not be apprehended by perception, but only by the reflection of the mind on itself, by *inspectio mentis.* This fundamental theory of rationalism stands in the sharpest antithesis to the empiricist theory of "associations"—but it too fails to overcome the inner tension between two fundamentally different elements of consciousness, between its mere "matter" and its pure "form." For here too the *synthesis* of the contents of consciousness is based upon an activity which in some way approaches the particular contents from outside. According

to Descartes, the "ideas" of outward perception, the ideas of lightness and darkness, roughness and smoothness, colored and resonant, are essentially given only as pictures (*velut picturae*) and, in this sense, as merely subjective events. What leads us beyond this stage, what enables us to progress from the diversity and variability of impressions to the unity and constancy of the object, is the function of judgment and "unconscious inference," which is totally independent of the impressions. Objective unity is a purely formal unity, which can neither be heard nor seen as such, but can be apprehended only in the logical process of pure thought. Descartes' *metaphysical* dualism is ultimately rooted in his *methodological* dualism: the theory of the absolute division between the substance of extension and the thinking substance, is merely a metaphysical expression for an antithesis which is discernible in his account of the pure function of consciousness.

And even with Kant, in the beginning of his *Critique of Pure Reason,* this antithesis between sensibility and thought, between the "material" and "formal" determinants of consciousness, retains its full force—though here he goes on to say that perhaps the two are connected in a common root unknown to us. The principal objection to this formulation is that the antithesis expressed in it is a product of abstraction; the particular factors of knowledge are logically evaluated, whereas the unity of the matter and form of consciousness, of the "particular" and the "universal," of sensory "data" and pure "principles of order," constitutes precisely that originally certain and originally known phenomenon which every *analysis* of consciousness must take as its point of departure. If we wished to characterize this process by a mathematical metaphor and symbol, despite the fact that it goes beyond the sphere of the mathematical, we might, in contradistinction to mere "association," choose the term "integration." The element of consciousness is related to the whole of consciousness not as an extensive part to a sum of parts, but as a differential to its integral. Just as the differential equation of a moving body expresses the trajectory and general law of its motion, we must think of the general structural laws of consciousness as given in each of its elements, in any of its cross sections —not however in the sense of independent contents, but of tendencies and directions which are already projected in the sensory particular. This, precisely, is the nature of a content of consciousness; it exists only in so far as it immediately goes beyond itself in various directions of synthesis. The consciousness of the moment contains reference to temporal succession; the consciousness of a single point in space contains reference to space as

the sum and totality of all possible designations of position; and there are countless analogous relations through which the form of the whole is expressed in the consciousness of the particular. The "integral" of consciousness is constructed not from the sum of its sensuous elements (a, b, c, d . . .), but from the totality, as it were, of its differentials of relation and form ($d r_1, d r_2, d r_3 \ldots$). The full actuality of consciousness is merely the unfolding of what was present as "potency" and general possibility in each of its separate factors. Here, in the most general terms, lies the critical solution of Kant's question as to how it is thinkable that because "something" is, something "other," totally different from it, must also be. The relation, which inevitably seemed more and more paradoxical the more sharply it was examined and analyzed from the standpoint of absolute being, becomes necessary and immediately intelligible when it is considered from the standpoint of consciousness. For here there is not from the very start an abstract "one," confronted by an equally abstract and detached "other"; here the one is "in" the many and the many is "in" the one: in the sense that each determines and represents the other.

4. Ideational Content of the Sign. Transcending the Copy Theory of Knowledge

So far we have aimed at a kind of critical "deduction," an explanation and justification of the concept of representation, in the belief that the representation of one content in and through another is an essential premise for the structure and formal unity of consciousness. The following study, however, will not deal with this general logical significance of the representative function. We shall seek to pursue the problem of signs, not backward to its ultimate "foundations," but forward to its concrete unfolding and configuration in the diverse cultural spheres.

We have acquired a new foundation for such an investigation. We must go back to "natural" symbolism, to that representation of consciousness as a whole which is necessarily contained or at least projected in every single moment and fragment of consciousness, if we wish to understand the artificial symbols, the "arbitrary" signs which consciousness creates in language, art, and myth. The force and effect of these mediating signs